The Power of Transparency: Information, Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia

Working Paper 24

February 2015

Authors: Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin A. Olken, Sudarno Sumarto

Can governments improve aid programs by providing information to beneficiaries? In our model, information can change how much aid citizens receive as they bargain with local officials who implement national programs. In a large-scale field experiment, we test whether mailing cards with program information to beneficiaries increases their subsidy from a subsidized rice program. Beneficiaries received 26 percent more subsidy in card villages. Ineligible households received no less, so this represents lower leakage. The evidence suggests that this effect is driven by citizen bargaining with local officials. Experimentally adding the official price to the cards increased the subsidy by 21 percent compared to cards without price information. Additional public information increased higher-order knowledge about eligibility, leading to a 16 percent increase in subsidy compared to just distributing cards. In short, increased transparency empowered citizens to reduce leakages and improve program functioning.

The TNP2K Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage discussion and exchange of ideas on poverty, social protection, and development issues.

Support for this publication has been provided by the Australian Government through the Poverty Reduction Support Facility (PRSF).

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Indonesia or the Government of Australia.

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